Aristotle on Dialectic and First Principles by Mesquita, António Pedro
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
Filosofia Unisinos 
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
18(1):57-62, jan/apr 2017
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2017.181.07
PHILOSOPHY SOUTH
ABSTRACT
Over time, several authors have argued that, for Aristotle, dialectic is a method of discovery 
or establishment of the principles of science in general. In this article, I will present four 
arguments against this view and propose a deflationary view of the role of dialectic in this 
regard. Accord ing to this view, such a role consists only in the defence of common princi-
ples against potential eristic attacks. 
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It should be highlighted that only 
the first principles of demonstative 
science (ἐπιστήµη ἀποδεικτικός) 
are here taken into account, with 
the exception, therefore, of those 
of non-demonstrative sciences 
(as, for instance, the practical and 
productive sciences).
3 See, among many occurences of 
this lemma: APo. A2, 71b19–72a8; 
Top. Ζ4, 141a23–142a21; EN Ζ3, 
1139b31–35.




Over time, several authors have defended that, for Aristotle, dialectic is a method of discov-
ery or establishment of the principles of science in general.2
In my view, four reasons speak against this thesis.
The first is that while, for Aristotle, each science, besides the common principles it shares with 
other sciences, has certain principles that are proper to it, he never interprets dialectic as a method 
for discovering, establishing or even justifying proper principles of particular sciences. Rather, dia-
lectic is simply a method for discussing (and sometimes upholding) common principles.
The second is that if dialectic were a general method of discovery or establishment of the 
principles of all sciences, it would have to discover or posit not only their common principles, but 
also those that are proper to each science. And since the task of discovering or positing the proper 
principles of each science belongs to the science to which the principles are proper, dialectic would 
become the science to which all principles are proper and therefore a “common” or “universal” 
science. However, the fact is that Aristotle is adamant that there cannot be a common science and 
that, specifically, dialectic is not such a common or universal science. 
The third reason has to do with the very special sense under which, according to Aristotle, a 
universal character can be attributed to dialectic. This sense is the following: dialectic, albeit not a 
universal science, has nonetheless a universal scope insofar as it addresses matters about which ev-
erybody knows and on which everyone may give an opinion. Hence, only when it addresses issues 
of which everyone has some knowledge and can speak – that is to say, only when it addresses such 
issues at a level that everyone can access and in such a way that everyone can give their opinion – 
can dialectic have a universal character. Now, principles are by their very nature “more knowable 
in themselves than they are for us”;3 thus, it is not by discovering or establishing the principles 
of science, which few people know about and toward which no inexpert opinions count, that 
dialectic is acknowledged by Aristotle as a comprehensive and transversal, all-encopassing (and, 
in this sense, universal) method.
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The fourth and last reason to reject the view that dia-
lectic is a method of discovery or establishment of the first 
principles of science in general is the following: Aristotle re-
peatedly mentions the process by which (proper) principles 
of science are posited and such process is not dialectic, but 
rather experience. It is therefore quite clear that for him the 
discovery or establishing of principles is not to be included 
under the scope of dialectic’s tasks. 
In what follows, I will expose these four arguments at 
greater length and, in a final, more positive section, disclose 
and defend my own view on the role of dialectic in this mat-
ter, namely that this role consists in the defence of common 
principles against potential eristic attacks. 
II
As is well known, according to Aristotle, each science 
has, besides the common principles it shares with other sci-
ences, or with a wide group of other sciences (τὰ κοινά, τὰ 
ἀξιώµατα), certain principles that are proper to it (τὰ ἴδια) 
(cf. APo. A10.76a37–b11; APo. A32.88b27–29; SE 11.172a36–
b1; but also see APr. A30.46a17–22, APo. A32.88a30–b6, e De 
an. A1.402a18–22). Now, Aristotle never interprets dialectic 
as a method of discovery, postulation or even justification of 
proper principles of particular sciences, but rather simply as a 
method of discussion of common principles. And even if it is true 
that dialectic may also be applied, by extension, to proper prin-
ciples of sciences, it can only be so under very restricted terms.
In effect, dialectic is repeatedly described by Aristotle as a 
special discipline which, since it has no proper genus as its ob-
ject (cf. APo. A11, 77a26–35; SE 11, 172a11–15; 11, 172a27–
30; Rh. A1, 1355b8–9; A 2, 1356a30–34), but rather discuss-
es problems in any domain (cf. Top. A1, 100a18–24; SE 11, 
172a27–30; 34, 183a37–b8; cf. SE 11, 172a36–b1; Metaph. Γ2, 
1004b17–26; EE A8, 1217b16–19; Rh. A1, 1354a1–3) – not 
based on true premises either, as it occurs with particular sci-
ences, but on “reputable” or “accepted opinions” (τὰ ἔνδοξα) 
(see Top. A1, 100a18–24, and SE 34, 183a37–b8; cf. APr. A27, 
43b1–17; APo. A33, 88b30–89a4; B19, 100b5–17; Metaph. 
Γ2, 1004b17–26) – has the special ability of crossing over 
with all sciences through the principles common to all of them 
(cf. APo. A 11, 77a26–35; SE 9, 170a20–b11; 11, 171b6–7; 
11, 172a27–30; 11, 172a36–b1). It is this ability that grants it 
the possibility (and sometimes the mission) of defending such 
common principles,4 as well as – and here are the specific terms 
that preside over its extension to proper principles of sciences, 
which Aristotle recognises only once5 – of carrying out a pre-
liminary examination or discussion of the principles proper to 
each science, based on the “accepted” or “reputable” opinions 
about the matters covered by these sciences. 
These are Aristotle’s own words in this regard:6
For if we reason from the principles appro-
priate to the science in question, it is impos-
sible to make any statement about these 
(since these principles are the first of them 
all) and it is by means of accepted opin-
ions about each that is necessary to discuss 
them. But this task is proper, or at any rate 
most appropriate, to dialectic: for since its 
ability to examine applies to the principles 
of all studies, it has a way to proceed (Top. 
A2, 101a37-b4).
The role attributed to dialectic in this text clearly con-
forms to the description above. It consists in listing and ana-
lyzing the ἔνδοξα which have implications on each science 
and in discussing their principles in the light of those ἔνδοξα, 
no more general conclusion being justifiably drawn from it.7 
Moreover, this is what Aristotle himself does in several 
of his scientific treatises, when he precedes the scientific dis-
cussion of the object with a list of received or generally accept-
ed opinions8 and with the presentation of the problems that 
the analyzed tradition has left pending (τὰ ἀπορούµενα) (as 
for example in Ph. A8, Γ4, ∆1, ∆6, ∆10, Ζ9, Θ2; De an. A1, 
402a10–403b19; Metaph. B1–6; EN Ε11–12, Η3). 
In no way do these necessary but preliminary moments 
replace the scientific discussion which is consequently devel-
oped, as would be the case if the methodology of science, and 
especially the postulation of first principles, were of an exclu-
sively dialectic nature.
Closer observation allows us to set out the six following 
points:
(i)  The intervention of dialectic on first principles is 
always confined to common principles, with the 
well-defined exception referred to above.
4 Cf. SE 9, 170a20–b11 (on the contrary, the defence of proper principles is expressly attributed to particular sciences).
5 Top. A2, 101a37–b4 (quoted below, in the text). Of all references to dialectic in association with the principles (APo. A11, 77a26–35; 
Top. A2, 101a36–b4; SE 9, 170a20–b11; 11, 171b6–7; 11, 172a27–30; 11, 172a36–b1), this is indeed the only passage that concerns 
proper principles.
6 All translations of the Topics by Smith (1994), with some adaptations in the key concepts.
7 Along the same lines, see Smith: “All that the present passage says is that such critical examinations are ‘useful’ in ‘discussing’ scien-
tific starting-points, and that falls far short of claiming that dialectic either establishes or discovers those starting-points. Finally, given 
Aristotle’s repeated claims in the Topics and On Sophistical Refutations that dialectical argument cannot establish anything, it would be 
more than a little surprising for him to hold that it can establish what scientific demonstrations cannot” (Smith, 1994, p. 54).
8 For example, in Physics (A2–4, 9, and as a rule at the onset of the discussion on each new topic), in De anima (A2–5), in Metaphyics 
(A3–10) or in Nicomachean Ethics (A3–4, A8–9, Η3, Η12, Κ2). This is a procedure which Aristotle himself theorises: see Cael. A10, 
279a5–12, as well as Metaph. α1, 993a30–b19, and B1, 995a24–b4.
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(ii)  The relationship between dialectic and common 
principles is not one of discovery, postulation or 
justification. 
(iii)   Common principles are not thought of as the pre-
ferred object of dialectic, but only as that by which 
dialectic relates to all sciences.
(iv)   Common principles as such only become the object 
of dialectic when they need to be defended against 
an eristic attack. 
(v)  Therefore, in no way can dialectic be regarded as 
a general science of the ἀξιώµατα, but only as a 
method of defending common principles (moreover, 
for reasons related to the very nature of common 
principles themselves, as will be discussed later).
(vi)  The universality of dialectic, as a discipline capable 
of discussing problems in any given field whatsoev-
er, is not to be attributed to any special relationship 
with common principles (since such a relationship, 
as previously mentioned, is confined to its defence 
in the event of an eristic attack), but rather to the 
specific nature of dialectic as a discipline with no 
material object.
There is no evidence, thus, to sustain the thesis that di-
alectic constitutes a general science of principles, or that it is 
the only or favored method to access first principles of science. 
Rather, the available data point in the opposite direction.
III
However, not only does Aristotle not say that dialectic 
is, in any sense of the expression, a science of principles or a 
method of accessing principles, but his theory of science would 
also clearly prevent him from doing so – a fact that Aristotle 
himself explicitly observes.
In fact, if dialectic were the general method of discov-
ery, postulation or justification of the principles of all sci-
ences, it would be so with regard to not only the common 
principles of all sciences, but also those proper to each one 
of them. And since this task belongs to the science to which 
the principles are proper (cf. APr. A30, 46a17–22), dialectic 
would ex hypothesi become the science to which all princi-
ples are proper and therefore would become a common or 
universal science. Nonetheless, the fact is that Aristotle is 
very clear that there cannot be a common science, as each 
science studies a single genus and each genus falls under 
certain principles, which are the proper principles to that 
science (cf. APo. A7; A9, 75b37–76a15; A12, 77a36–b15; 
A28, 87a38–b4; A32; SE 9, 170a20–b11; 11, 172a11–15; 
GA B8, 747b27–748a15; see also APr. A30, 46a17–22; De 
an. A1, 402a18–22; Metaph. B2, 997a18–25; K3, 1060b31–
36; K7, 1063b36–1064a4). For dialectic to be a common 
science, it would be necessary for all genera to lead to an 
overall genus, whose principles would be the proper prin-
ciples of the common science and the common principles 
of all particular sciences, which is not the case.9 Or dialectic 
would have to be the superordinate science of all particular 
sciences, a condition that does not obtain either, as there 
cannot be, for the reason given above, a single science to 
which all other sciences are subordinate.10
That is why it is also not legitimate to think that dia-
lectic deals indirectly with proper principles simply because 
it deals with common principles in the first place. In fact, this 
would imply admitting that proper principles are, up to a cer-
tain point, subordinate to common principles and that they 
may be deduced from them. For Aristotle, on the contrary, 
the ἀξιώµατα are not principles from which everything can 
be deduced, given that the supreme genera under which all 
beings fall (the categories) are different and only with the 
contribution of proper principles of each of these genera can 
actual conclusions be drawn.11
Furthermore, this would, once again, make dialectic a 
universal science, which, as we have seen, is prevented by the 
plurality of genera irreducible to each other and to an (illuso-
ry) common primary genus, as well as by the corresponding 
plurality of particular sciences irreducible to each other and to 
an (illusory) primary science.
That is why Aristotle emphatically and repeatidly un-
derlines that dialectic is not a common or a universal science12 
– not only, by the way, for the reasons set out above, but 
primarily for the more basic reason that dialectic is not even 
a science, since it does not operate κατ’ ἀλήθειαν, but only 
κατὰ δόξαν (cf. APr. A1, 24a22–b15; A30, 46a3–10; APo. 
A2, 72a8–14; A19, 81b18–23; Top. A1, 100a25–b23; A14, 
105b30–31; Θ1, 155b3–16; Θ3, 159a11–14; SE 2, 165a38–
b11; SE 11, 172a36–b1; Metaph. Γ2, 1004b17–26; see also De 
an. A1, 402b25–403a2).
9 The maxima genera are themselves plural (the then categories): cf. especially APr. A27, 42b20–43; APo. A9-22; A32, 88a36–b3.
10 The only exception to the rule of one genus corresponding to one science is, in fact, the case of the subordinate sciences (see again 
APo. A7; A9, 75b37–76a15; A28, 87a38–b4; and also: APo. A13, 78a22–79a16; A15, 98a24–34). But even this exception is more appar-
ent than real, as the principles of subordinate sciences are common to the superordinate ones and only to this extent are they shared 
by both (cf. APo. A9).
11 Cf. APo. A32, 88a36–b3, freely paraphrased here. This thesis is obviously in line with the statement in the same treatise, according to 
which the principles of non-contradiction and of excluded middle only take part of the premises of a demonstration under exceptional 
circumstances (in the first case, when the conclusions are instances of the principle of non-contradiction; and, in the second case, when 
the demonstration is made per impossibile: cf. APo. A11, 77a10–25.
12 Cf. SE 9, 170a20–b11, and 11, 172a11–15. For the general thesis that there is no universal science, see especially Metaph. A9, 
992b18–993a7, and EE A8, 1217b25–1218a1, and cf. EN A4, 1096a23–29.
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This is then the second major reason why dialectic can-
not be the universal method of establishing the first principles 
of sciences. In short: there cannot be, in general, a universal 
science; and dialectic, in particular, is not that science.
IV
This leads us to the third major reason.
The universality of dialectic, on which rests its ability to 
discuss problems in any domain, far from requiring its inter-
vention in the realm of first principles, is due to three motives 
that partially exclude it.
Firstly, its material emptiness: it is because dialectic does 
not have any genus as its proper object, that it can universally 
resort to cover all genera, and as a result crossover with all 
sciences (see APo. A11, 77a26–35; SE 11, 172a27–30; and cf. 
SE 11, 172a11–15).
Secondly, the circumstance that, also for this reason, dia-
lectic is not a science, but only a method or “a capacity for fur-
nishing arguments” (δυνάµεις τινὲς τοὺ πορίσαι λόγους) 
– and precisely for furnishing arguments in any field.13
Thirdly, the fact that dialectic addresses topics about 
which, by definition, everybody knows and anyone can give 
an opinion (cf. Rh. A1, 1354a1–3), a fact that constitutes not 
only a justification of its universality, but also a restriction in 
the meaning to be given to such universality. 
Generally, one can say that the first point prevents dia-
lectic from being a science, the third excludes it from being the 
general method for establishing first principles, and the second 
explains exactly in what sense dialectic has a universal nature. 
Given that enough has been said about the first point 
and the third one is the most fundamental for the present dis-
cussion, let us begin with the second point.
What does it imply for each one of the particular scienc-
es to declare that dialectic is “a capacity for furnishing argu-
ments” in any field?
To “furnish arguments” (naturally of a dialectical nature) 
in any field, and therefore for any science, surely cannot mean 
submitting to particular sciences the general argumentative 
schemes they would be allowed to use, regardless of any com-
pliance with their proper principles, in their strictly scientific 
routine. This would be indeed unacceptable in two respects: 
firstly, science can only proceed demonstratively from its 
proper principles; and, secondly, scientific demonstration is 
based on true premises, whereas dialectical arguments are by 
definition based on premises which are simply “accepted” as 
true, i.e., on ἔνδοξα.
If we bear in mind Aristotle’s actual practice in his own 
scientific treatises, then to furnish dialectical arguments to the 
particular sciences must rather mean to provide them with 
an introductory counterbalance of theses and reasons previ-
ously set forth on a certain topic of inquiry – a counterbal-
ance which scientists should be acquainted with and take into 
due account when proposing an explanatory theory for that 
topic.14 The advantage of this preliminary counterbalance is 
that it allows the scientist to pick up the pros and contras that, 
according to the “accepted” opinions, are raised in relation to 
each problem and thus map out the difficulties that, in his ac-
tual scientific investigation, will have to be taken into account 
and resolved.
It is interesting that, of the three utilities that Aristotle 
assigns to dialectic (Top. A2, 101a25–36), two have a direct 
link with this application to science: the record of ἔνδοξα; and 
the habit of testing an aporia in both senses (πρὸς ἀµφότερα 
διαπορῆσαι) in order to be able to easily distinguish true 
from false in every topic.15
Undoubtedly, this doctrine explains the already men-
tioned fact that Aristotle’s own investigations in his scientific 
treatises are often introduced by an exhaustive conspectus of 
the tradition and by a detailed study of the difficulties to be 
faced and resolved.
Let us now look at the third ground for the universality 
of dialectic and the reason why it implies that dialectic can-
not establish first principles: dialectic addresses matters which 
everybody knows about and on which everyone may give an 
opinion.
This certainly gives an argument for the universality of 
dialectic. However, it also shows in what exact sense one can 
speak of dialectic being universal. 
In effect, if dialectic is universal because it addresses ob-
jects which everyone knows, it is also only while it addresses ob-
jects that everyone knows, that is, only while it addresses such 
objects at a level which everyone can access, and in such a way 
that everyone can give their opinion, that dialectic is universal.
13 Rh. A2, 1356a33–34. Note that this characterisation derives from the canonical definition of dialectic: see Top. A1, 100a18–24, and 
SE 34, 183a37–b8; but cf. also Top. A2, 101a28–30 (and note: µέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥᾷον περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐποχειρεῖν δυνησόµεθα), 
as well as Θ14, 164b1–7. Evans summarizes perfectly this point when he states: “Dialectic is indeed concerned with everything about 
everything, as first philosophy is not; but the price which it pays for this universality is that, unlike first philosophy, it is not scientific in 
character” (Evans, 1977, p. 48). To this note of generality, the Eudemian Ethics adds another note: dialectical arguments are not only 
common (κοινοί), but also fundamentally destructive (ἀναιρετικοί); cf. EE A8, 1217b16–19.
14 That is why Aristotle frequently precedes the analytical consideration of a problem (i.e., its consideration in accordance with proper 
principles of the science in question) with a dialectical approach (λογικῶς, i.e., general and abstract, because it is independent from the 
principles proper to any science and therefore applicable to all fields), or prefixes to the development of scientific arguments a number 
of merely “logical” arguments: see paradigmatically APo. A22, 82b37–84a30; A24, 85b23–86a30; A32, 88a19–b7; Ph. Γ5, 204b4–205a7; 
Metaph. Ζ4, 1029b13–1030b3; cf. Cael. A7, 275b12–276a17, Metaph. A2, 982a4–b10, and the long interregnum καθόλου in Cael. 
A10–12, 280a32–283b9.
15 The first, of a “gymnastic” nature, consists precisely in the ability to argue about any topic.
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When Aristotle declares, in the Sophistical Refutations, 
that from common principles qua common dialectic can be-
come an “investigation of all things” and sets itself as a “certain 
art”,16 this statement should probably be understood in the 
same vein, thus implying that such an investigation will only 
proceed to the extent of the knowledge of common people 
and in the proportion of the general opinion. And, no doubt, 
it is with this precept in mind that Aristotle declares in the 
Metaphysics that dialectic discusses all topics, but in a merely 
inquisitive fashion (πειραστική) and not with a view to knowl-
edge (γνωριστική).17
Now, this quite obviously excludes dialectic from being 
an art of principles, as they are by nature more knowable in 
themselves than for us and therefore necessarily inaccessible 
to common knowledge as suchv (see APo. A2, 71b19–72a8; 
Top. Ζ4, 141a23–142a21; EN Ζ3, 1139b31–35; cf. APr. B16, 
64b28–65a9; Top. A1, 100a25–29; A1, 100a30–b21; Θ1, 
155b3–16; Θ3, 159a11–14; Θ11, 161b30–33). But, at the 
same time, it does not exclude the possibility for it to include in 
its goal, as a “certain art”, the defence of common principles, in 
a way yet to be deciphered. 
Once again, we are led to conclude, therefore, that for 
Aristotle dialectic is not the general method of establishing 
the principles of science – but that the defence of common 
principles against potential eristic attacks may fall under the 
scope of its mission. 
V
The fourth and final reason for this conclusion is trivial. 
It is nevertheless important to recall it, given that some de-
fenders of the thesis under analysis appear to forget it at times. 
Aristotle repeatedly mentions the process by which 
(proper) first principles are established and this process is 
not dialectic, but rather (some kind of) experience (see, for 
instance: APr. A30, 46a17–22; APo. A18, 81a38–b9; A31; 
B2, 90a24–30; B19, 99b20–100b5; Cael. Γ7, 306a5–9; GC A2, 
316a5–14; HA A6, 491a7–14; GA Γ10, 760b27–33; EN A7, 
1098b3–4; Ζ9, 1142a16–20).
Regardless of how we wish to interpret this doctrine, 
what seems to be an inescapable fact is that for Aristotle the 
establishing of the first principles of science is not within the 
powers of dialectic. 
VI
It is time to sum up.
If our account is right, dialectic plays no role whatsoev-
er in the discovery, postulation or justification of the proper 
principles of particular sciences. Concerning these principles, 
the task of dialectic is limited to its examination and discus-
sion in the light of ἔνδοξα. 
The role of dialectic is therefore limited, in principle, to 
ἀξιώµατα. 
But what exactly is this role?
Let us first recall what it is not. 
Surely, it is not up to dialectic to discover or postulate 
them. It is not up to dialectic to discover them, since it does 
not discover anything. Dialectic discusses given propositions, in 
order to confirm or refute them, according to the role that is as-
signed to the dialectician in the question/answer exercise, based 
on accepted opinions, recognised as such by both parties.18 
But it is not up to dialectic to postulate them either. In 
fact, the confirmation or refutation of given propositions that 
results from the dialectical exercise, supported as they are on 
purely endoxic premises, only have value within the frame-
work determined by the dependence from these premises. 
And since the ἔνδοξα are, by definition, only accepted as true, 
and may in fact be false,19 no reasoning based on ἔνδοξα can 
truthfully establish anything at all, and therefore no reason-
ing based on ἔνδοξα can establish common principles, which 
are principles of demonstration and therefore true principles 
(cf. APo. A2, 71b19–33; A9, 75b37–76a15; A19, 81b18–23; 
Top. A1, 100a25–29). 
What, then, is the role of dialectic regarding common 
principles?
That role has already been suggested. The role of defend-
ing common principles from an eristic attack, that is, from a 
malicious attack, made only victoriae gratia.20
In fact, contrary to proper principles, common princi-
ples are, according to Aristotle, necessary in virtue of them-
16 Ἔστιν ἐκ τούτων περὶ ἁπάντων πεῖραν λαµβάνειν καὶ εἶναι τέχνην τινά” (SE 11, 172a39–b1).
17 Cf. Metaph. Γ2, 1004b17–26. The Eudemian Ethics, as we have seen (above, n. 13), would even add: in a merely destructive way (cf. 
A8.1217b16–19).
18 Cf. Top. Θ14, 164b1–7, and Θ1, 155b3–16; but see also: APr. A1, 24a22–b12; APo. A11, 77a31–35; A2, 72a8–14; Top. Θ2, 158a14–21; 
SE 10, 171a38–b2; 11, 171b3–6; 11, 172a15–21. The criteria for an opinion to be “accepted”, in the technical sense, are clearly de-
fined at the beginning of the Topics: accepted opinions [ἔνδοξα] are those “which seem so [true and primary] to everyone, or to most 
people, or to the wise – to all of them, or to most, or to the most famous and estemed [τοῖς µάλιστα γνωρίµοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις]” (Top. A1, 
100b21–23). For similar descriptions of ἔνδοξα, see: Top. A14, 105a34–b12, and Γ1, 116a13–20.
19 Cf. especially Top. Θ12, 162b27: εἰ µὲν γὰρ ἐκ ψευδῶν ἐνδόξων δέ, λογικός; but see also APo. B19, 100b5–7.
20 As Aristotle underlines in SE 11, 171b22–34, eristic is moved by the desire to win the discussion at any cost (although it may 
also be accompanied by the desire to monetarily profit from it, in which case it should be properly called “sophistic”). That is why, 
for Aristotle, the eristic contender is, by definition, a disloyal quarreller who uses any means to give the appearance of having 
won. The means that he uses and the way of recognising them and to denounce them as eristic are the object of the Sophistical 
Refutations.
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selves and recognized as such.21 Now, if common principles are 
so, surely they can only be questioned on the basis of an eristic 
argument. Dialectic is therefore required, since it is its task to 
reduce sophistical refutations.22 
A good example of this dialectical defence of a com-
mon principle in the corpus is the discussion of the principle 
of non-contradiction in book Γ 3-8 of Metaphysics. In this 
text, Aristotle clearly explains the status of such a defence: it 
consists in refuting the rejection of the principle of non-con-
tradiction by showing the impossibility of such a negation (cf. 
Metaph. Γ4, 1006a11–28).
In short: proper principles of sciences are known in a 
non-dialectical way, by a procedure that somehow involves 
experience; common principles are acknowledged by each 
particular science with the particular content that applies to 
that science,23 even if dialectic may defend them from any at-
tempt of an eristic attack.
The conclusion is not, therefore, that dialectic has no 
function as regards the principles of science. It is, rather, that 
its intervention is much more limited and modest than those 
campaigning for the thesis under analysis believe, as that func-
tion is primarily limited to common principles and only con-
sists of supporting, and not discovering or establishing, them. 
In the case of proper principles, dialectic is only required in 
a supplementary way, for the preliminary analysis of the re-
ceived opinions and the acknowledgment of the ἀπορίαι 
which result from them and which the scientific investigation 
will have to face.
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